We analyze definitions used by researchers about a single concept: Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF). It is still a matter of recent controversy and debate. We place these definitions into one 
Introduction
Sovereign Wealth Funds are nothing new. Hildebrand (2007) both SOEs and SWFs share an important feature. They are both controlled by governments; they are both 'sovereigns' and it is precisely this 'sovereignty' that raises suspicions among the investee countries.
Given the differences in definitions of SWFs and widely varying estimates of their assets under management, we were not surprised to find that seven sources of information on SWFs yielded seven estimates of SWF aggregate size. Estimates range from $2.7tn 1 (GeoEconomica, 3 2012 ); $2.9tn (Sovereign Investment Lab at University of Bocconi, 2011); $3.2tn (Truman, 2011) ; $4.6tn (Preqin, 2012) ; $4.8tn (TheCityUK, 2012) ; $4.9tn (ESADEgeo at ESADE Business School, 2012), up to the $5.3tn guessed by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2013) . The average of these figures (whatever it actually means, given that different sources measure different things)-is $4.05tn and we will use it for the size of the industry. For consistency, we will use the updated ESADEgeo online version -hereinafter cited as ESADEgeo (2013) -as the proxy for SWF assets under management.
The aggregate size of SWFs is almost double the whole hedge fund industry (estimated at $2.13 trillion at June 2012) and four times the volume managed by private equity funds, with estimates varying from $1 to $2 trillion 2 . This concentration of power is another source of fear for recipient countries. SWFs are not only sovereign (state-owned) funds but are really big ones. When compared to the hedge fund industry, we note that the ten largest hedge funds jointly managed $233bn worth assets at the end of 2011 (Financial Times, 2012) , while Kuwait Investment Authority -a SWF ranked in the 7 th in the industry -manages $290bn worth of assets on its own. There are over 10,000 hedge funds (Hedge Funds Review, 2012) , and just some 70 SWFs. The average hedge fund controls $213,000 while the average SWF 3 manages $57 bn.
This paper was originally conceived as an investigation to pin down what a SWF is. During our research, it quickly became apparent that SWFs are constantly evolving, making it hard -if not impossible -to come up with an all-embracing definition for a wide variety of SWFs. We initially sought to set clear criteria for determining whether a given institution qualified as a SWF or not. When this proved unrealistic, we changed the scope of our paper. We offer a 'concentric definition' of SWFs (hence the reference to onion layers in the paper's title) to give a better idea of the nature of SWFs and leave others to argue the toss when it comes to specific cases. We will explore the various elements making up definitions of SWFs and try to identify which layers are at the 'onion's' heart and which ones lie further out (See Figure 1) .
Figure 1. Sovereign Wealth Funds: More layers than an onion.
Note: concentric circles begin with "the core" characteristics of SWFs (investment funds and state ownership). This figure includes the 11 features cited by researchers when defining SWF. The closer to "the core" the more the feature has been used to define SWFs.
There are some studies focused on the challenges of defining SWFs. provides a useful way of thinking and expresses many of the ideas that we present in this paper. The clarity of his argument is all the more remarkable when one considers the early stage of SWF research at the time his working paper was released. The distinction he draws between stateowned enterprises and SWFs is particularly useful. Rozanov (2011) (Rozanov, 2005) and some other early definitions shaping the notion of SWFs. He focuses on the definition set by the International Working Group on SWFs in 2008 and included, in The Santiago Principles. The rest of his paper explores the interesting corporate governance implications of transparency, non-commercial motives and reciprocity.
Our contribution differs from these two previous definitional analyses in two respects. First, we conduct a complete literature review looking for SWF definitions appearing in published papers from different fields such as Finance, International Law, and Economics. Second, we distilled the definitions into eleven commonly-used elements to define SWFs. The paper is structured as follows. This section 1 gives an introduction to the subject; Section 2 contains a literature review identifying eleven elements included in definitions of SWFs; Section 3 discusses of each of these eleven elements, illustrating points with specific SWFs and the implications in each case; Section 4 concludes. Rozanov (2005) first coined the term ´Sovereign Wealth Fund´. He did not give a formal definition but for the first time it put oil funds and non-commodity Asian funds into the same group. In 2007, the then Director of the IMF's Research Department, said "We don't know too much about these major state-owned players" (Johnson, 2007) and his main concern was that such uncertainties might lead to greater investment protectionism. Some months later, the 
Literature review and summarizing definition
have high risk tolerance; (5) have a long-term investment horizon (Jen, 2007) . Subsequent definitions drew on these five characteristics.
Vagueness concerning the nature of SWFs prompted the IMF (2008), a research team led by Blundell-Wignall et al. (2008) from the OECD; two ECB researchers (Beck & Fidora, 2008) Santiago Principles definition has been adopted by a growing number of researchers (Bertoni & Lugo, 2011; Dyck & Morse, 2011; Castelli & Scacciavillani, 2012) .
As noted before, one of the four guiding objectives of The Santiago Principles encourages
SWFs to "invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations", the aim being to alleviate fears among recipient countries and to improve the governance of its members. However, there are no compulsory rules for the IWG members. Precisely, the fact that these are soft-rules has eased the inclusion of 27 SWFs from 24 countries. As stated by Victoria Barbary (currently leading one of the main research and data centers on SWFs in London) only 12 of the 35 Santiago Principles (and sub-principles) requires disclosure (Monk, 2010) . That is why SWFs rank better under The Santiago Principles than under the stricter Truman scoreboard (Behrendt, 2010) . and Monk (2008) We have examined publicly-available information (including published research but excluding private -and expensive -dataset collections) to check whether potential SWFs fit these 11
criteria. Normally, we focus on the vision and mission statements, portfolio composition (when available) and their governance structures. Our findings are explained in the following section.
Eleven categories for a SWF definition a) The consensus starting point: SWFs are sovereign-owned investment vehicles
There are few points researchers agree upon when it comes to defining SWFs. One of them is that SWFs are public investors (Rose, 2008) . This means at least two things: (a) SWFs are 'public' creatures; that is, the owner is a government or government-linked institution; (b)
SWFs invest these public funds.
As "government-owned investment vehicles' (Kotter & Lel, 2011) ; "government-owned and controlled (directly or indirectly) investment funds" (Clark, Dixon and Monk, 2013) , to name just a few.
Disagreement may arise from two sources. Regarding SWFs' nature: we have found definitions that speak of 'pools' while others refer to 'investment vehicles', or 'arrangements'. This point reflects doubt about the legal nature of SWFs, which may vary depending on varying regulatory frameworks. Funds and pools may have different legal status. Funds may refer to a structured way of gathering pools of assets. Usually, neither funds nor pools are subjects of rights and obligations given that they have no legal personality. The investment/asset managers are the legal entities backing these pools/funds. Moreover, some SWFs claim they are an "investment management organization" (GIC), "investment company" (Temasek), "investment manager" (CIC), "a world class investor" (QIA). Hence, the legal constituents of SWFs will require further research as they have an impact on their organizational structures and may then affect how SWFs invest.
Another source of disagreement -the 'public ownership' aspect -may also need further refinement. Definitions state that SWFs are owned, controlled, or created by a government, however each term implies different issues. Some definitions (Monitor-FEEM, 2009) require that SWFs to be wholly-owned by the government, while others do not specify a given level of ownership -opening the door to public-private investment funds qualifying as SWFs. In general, we should say that it is important to note both features: ownership and control.
Otherwise, the range of state-owned institutions that are controlled, at least in part, by private institutions that would qualify as SWFs would be huge. How much of this control is exercised by governments will be discussed in the following sections. This public feature will allow us to draw a clear dividing line between hedge or mutual funds and SWFs. However, as we have seen, there is scope for mixed-nature funds. Should we weed out SWFs that include some element of private funds in their capital?
As a corollary, one should mention the 'pools' of assets SWFs manage. These pools commonly arise from two sources: commodities and foreign exchange reserves 6 . The former, reflects the fact that natural resources 'belong to the state'. Such pools may arise from revenues from state companies exploiting these resources or from taxes and/or royalties paid by multinational enterprises (both local and foreign) engaged in this activity. Another group of SWFs receives its funds from foreign exchange reserves. Central banks 'separate' some of their foreign exchange reserves and allow these investment funds to manage them. How this 'separation' is achieved in practice remains unclear. Thus one also needs to clarify whether their accountancy differs from that used by the central bank. The IMF is working on these accountancy issues.
Another consequence of the previous explanation is that defining SWFs as investment funds may exclude from our classification those state-owned enterprises whose main objective is not investment. Monitor-FEEM (2009) , the Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA). 7 The assets that make up its portfolio include: global private and public stocks; bonds; foreign currencies; financial derivatives; commodities; treasury bills; real estate and infrastructure funds.
We tend to include in the SWF category those investment funds arising from stakes in SOEs in the group. This is the case of the Singaporean Temasek ($198bn) and the Malaysian Khazanah Nasional Bhd ($28bn).
b) SWFs are not national funds
There is general agreement on the international character of SWFs. It is easy to find governments in many countries around the globe that own funds or agencies that promote coinvestments in their territories. Should we consider each of these national (and often regional) funds, as SWFs? Widening the definition in this way may lead to serious confusion over SWFs' nature. For example, consider the JEREMIE fund in Andalusia (€235m) funded from the regional government and the European Regional Development Fund. JEREMIE invests through convertible loans but also through equity in Andalusian companies. These funds are managed by governments at both regional and national levels and do not have explicit pension liabilities.
One way of excluding them from the SWF category is to rule them out because they do not invest in international assets.
This international focus is supported by over 70% of the definitions analyzed. They require SWFs to hold foreign investments. Again, the issue of 'degree' will need detailed examination.
For example, Mumtalakat´s analysis of their portfolio reveals that its only foreign investment is in Britain's McLaren Supercars (it owns 50%). Is this sole foreign investment enough to label
Mumtalakat as a SWF? What percentage of a portfolio has to be invested internationally to make a national SWF into a 'pure' SWF? It is not only a matter of degree. We should also consider these issues from a dynamic perspective: Temasek was a pure domestic fund which turned into a renowned international (mostly regional) investor (Rozanov, 2011 (Balding, 2012) . In this broad category we include those funds set up to stabilize fiscal balances and those created to 'control' the exchange rate. However, both fiscal and currency stabilization funds were constrained by liquidity needs. They invest primarily in liquid assets such as debt securities or deposits that will allow them to intervene fast. However, as explained in 57% of the analyzed definitions, SWFs are characterized by their risky investments. We want to separate SWFs from pure stabilization-oriented funds. Some of them are managing large amounts of money but they focus exclusively on stabilizing their economies using strategies based on fixed-income assets Even so, debate still rages on the boundaries that will allow a government fund to qualify as a SWF. Just how large should risky assets be within their portfolios to qualify? Is it sufficient that they invest in just one risky asset to qualify within this group? More interestingly, how can we capture the fact that SWFs change and evolve over time? Do they have to follow an active management strategy? Chilean PRF ($5.9bn) has recently opted for a passive investment strategy in both global corporate bonds (20% through Barclays Capital Global Aggregate:
Corporate Bond Index) and equity (15% via MSCI All Country World Index). Does this strategy make it a SWF? Thus, the 'level or percentage' of risky assets within SWF portfolios remains a major issue in seeking an appropriate definition.
The notion of 'risk-free assets' has taken a big knock given 'the fiscal cliff' in the U.S. and the EU's recurrent sovereign debt crises. Even so, we still consider some investments to be riskfree (Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2012 needed to facilitate the diversification of accumulated reserves into higher yielding assets (…).
The idea was that by investing sovereign wealth in riskier assets, and generating higher returns, government sponsors could contain the costs of holding such reserves" (Clark et al., 2013: 3-4) .
d) Liabilities: An old consensus with new characteristics
The literature evidences a major effort to draw a distinction between SWFs and public pension funds. To be eligible as a SWF requires the absence of 'explicit current pension liabilities'.
Unlike public pension funds, SWFs do not deal with a stream of current pension obligations. One should clarify that in most cases debt is issued by those SWFs established as company-like structures. That debt typically supports operating companies rather than leverage returns;
anyway, private creditors would affect SWFs strategies to some extent.
As noted by Schena and Chaturvedi (2011) , Temasek and Khazanah issued debt recently. They have raised capital in an innovative fashion. However, these bond issues imply greater public scrutiny. Now, they are not only reporting to their sponsoring state but also to their creditors.
Their 'new' private creditors will require more detailed disclosure. It is worth noting -as the authors did -that these SWF issuance documents are longer than the SWFs annual reports.
Thus, 'private liabilities' seem to enhance their international accountability beyond their sponsoring government structures and would lead to more transparent funds (Gelpern, 2011 refer to this "private accountability").
e) Long-term strategy
SWFs are typically included in the broad group of long-term investors. However, several recent events are challenging this assumed role. For instance, Beijing's government put CIC under stricter scrutiny after its failed investment in Morgan Stanley. Public criticism from government and media lead to more pressure for short-term performance. Managers at CIC had to demonstrate their investment prowess and they shifted (at least temporarily) from their 'longterm stewardship,' to the quest for better returns. To some degree, government shareholders have proven to be as impatient as their private sector counterparts (Monk, 2011) .
There was an interest in identifying SWFs as being the longest-term investors in the world. The 'absence' of explicit liabilities, a peculiar source of financing and unusual governance structures (they report only to their sponsoring-government) all favor a long-term investment horizon. In fact, some initiatives have tried to link infrastructure funding needs (in emerging markets, and specifically Africa) to SWFs. However, long-term investments require major efforts in: (1) providing human resources; (2) measuring performance; (3) financial profile and fail to achieve long-term aims or transform into strategic investors and lose legitimacy as global investors (Clark et al., 2013) .
f) Source of funds and sub-national SWFs

Source of funds
Slightly over half of the definitions take into account the source of funds. and a newly-established one in North Dakota ($0.3bn). The solution to this particular issue will also affect the sub-national SWF set up in Alberta (Canada). This strict requirement has two outcomes. On the one hand, it helps to simplify the separation of SWFs and any other subnational funds investing locally. On the other hand, there is still scope to enlarge on what sovereign authority means (i.e., how this 'sovereignty' affects the way SWFs invest and the nature of the differences between a national and a sub-national fund) -something that goes beyond the scope of our study but which opens the door to further research.
g) Purpose and financial objectives
Purpose From the outset, there has been an interest in classifying SWFs according to different criteria.
Here, we consider various categories based on a SWF's stated purpose and its financial objectives. The IMF has made an effort to identify which categories best fit the various policies pursued by SWFs. It initially identified five (IMF, 2008) : (1) Other authors (Clark et al., 2013) 15 Monitor-FEEM (2009) argued that SAMA investments abroad are "low-risk." The fact is that behind the foreign securities label used by SAMA we found debt (usually bonds), equity or even derivatives, thus qualifying as risk or high-risk securities. 16 Long-Term Growth Portfolio positions at the end of 2012 were as follow: Emerging market bonds and equities ($5.3bn); RMB assets, including bonds and equities ($6bn); Private equity ($6bn); Real Estate ($1.7bn); Outstanding investment commitments at the end of 2012 ($8.2bn). 17 HKMA-EF has its own governance structures, different from its parent HKMA, despite it is not public available information.
The Economist (2011) It seems that huge central banks or monetary authorities are actually separating a portion of their large pools of assets (normally foreign-exchange reserves) into 'internal' special units taking higher risks. These 'internal special units' are not invested in safe and liquid instruments ready to attend budgetary or currency management needs. They are seeking higher returns by investing in a broader set of assets that include corporate bonds, equities, and derivatives. We acknowledge that there is still a need for better descriptions of the institutional framework in which SWFs operate. We should advance our knowledge of how central banks, SWFs, foreignexchange pools and governments interact in each case.
To sum up, there is still a need to refine our views on the most appropriate institutional structure for SWFs. Das et al. (2009) 
Conclusion
We have analyzed over thirty definitions of a single concept: Sovereign Wealth Funds. We continued early efforts to clarify the definition of SWF. Our results show that scholars and practitioners agree on just two features: SWFs are state-owned and they are investment units.
A third feature (argue by 68% of our sample) -which better characterizes SWFs -is that their foreign investments make up a sizeable chunk of their total holdings. Scholars have yet to agree on the minimum required percentage. The source of funding (53%) remains one of the main characteristics. However, we forecast it will become of less interest as funding sources become more heterogeneous. Two other features share the same support (42%): SWF invest in securities yielding high-return assets (above the risk-free rate) and pursue long-term strategies. Other characteristics include policy purposes, financial objectives, sub-national considerations and separation from the central bank or ministry of finance.
We began this project to come up with a working definition of SWFs with a view to fostering research in the field. After reviewing the definitions, we realized a different strategy was called for SWFs are living entities. Today's wholly domestic funds can swiftly mutate into tomorrow's international investors. Some funds are starting to acquire leverage for investments so should we treat them as if they were fundamentally different? They can enter into riskier activities, they can change their policy purposes or even their funding source but they will always be Sovereign Investors. Three other characteristics should probably be added if we want to differentiate these particular actors from other well-known state-owned investment agencies.
First, the fact that SWFs hold foreign assets allows us to exclude purely domestic funds and many sub-national funds. Second, the absence of current pension liabilities distinguishes these sovereign funds from public pension funds. Third, SWFs act in risky investment scenarios. This will help us to distinguish between SWFs and mere stabilization funds whose concerns are limited to liquidity and currency volatility.
The core of our onion is clear: SWFs are state-owned investment funds. From there one can create one's own definition, adding as many layers as needed. The first three layersportfolios with risky securities, non-pension and limited liabilities, foreign holdings -help to distinguish SWFs from stabilization funds, public pension funds and pure domestic funds (respectively). The outer layers can be more easily discussed separately and used if and where needed.
In the end, a SWF definition remains obscure, complex and to some extent elusive. The dynamic nature of SWFs, morphing institutions in a continuous evolution led us to conclude that there is no definition capturing the essence of these new instruments of state intervention. One may ask why should we focus on the definition and categorization, rather it seems we should learn how these new concentric concepts move from layer to another in the real world and how these moves affect global finance, international investment and national development. 
ROZANOV (2005)
A different type of public-sector player has started to register on the radar screen-we shall refer to them as sovereign wealth managers (…) Sovereign wealth funds are a byproduct of national budget surpluses, accumulated over the years due to favorable macroeconomic, trade and fiscal positions, coupled with long-term budget planning and spending restraint. (…) These are neither traditional public-pension funds nor reserve assets supporting national currencies.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREAUSURY (2007)
A government investment vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages those assets separately from the official reserves of the monetary authorities (the Central Bank and reserve-related functions of the Finance Ministry)
IMF-GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (2007) "SWFs can generally be defined as special investment funds created or owned by governments to hold foreign assets for long-term purposes"
IMF-BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL (2007)
Some governments create special purpose government funds, usually called sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Created and owned by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets. The funds are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports. Sovereign wealth funds -or state investment funds -are financial vehicles owned by states which hold, manage or administer public funds and invest them in a wider range of assets of various kinds. Their funds are mainly derived from excess liquidity in the public sector stemming from government fiscal surpluses or from official reserves at central banks. SWFs can be categorised into two types of funds according to their primary purpose. On the one hand, so-called stabilisation funds aim to even out the budgetary and fiscal policies of a country by separating them from short-term budgetary or reserve developments which may be caused by price changes in the underlying markets, i.e. in oil or minerals, but also in foreign exchange conditions. On the other hand, savings or intergenerational funds create a store of wealth for future generations by using the assets they are allocated to spread the returns on a country's natural resources across generations in an equitable manner.
Even though similar in their purpose and investment behaviour to other forms of funds -such as pension funds, investment funds and trusts, hedge or private-equity funds -SWFs essentially differ from the former as they are not privately owned, raising important questions in terms of financial market policy and corporate governance. SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.
This definition excludes, inter alia, foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy purposes, operations of state-owned enterprises in the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, or assets managed for the benefit of individuals.
Three key elements:
1. Ownership: SWFs are owned by the general government, which includes both central government and subnational governments.
Investments:
The investment strategies include investments in foreign financial assets, so it excludes those funds that solely invest in domestic assets.
3. Purposes and Objectives: Established by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs are created to invest government funds to achieve financial objectives, and (may) have liabilities that are only broadly defined, thus allowing SWFs to employ a wide range of investment strategies with a medium-to longterm timescale. SWFs are created to serve a different objective than, for example, reserve portfolios held only for traditional balance of payments purposes. While SWFs may include reserve assets, the intention is not to regard all reserve assets as SWFs.
Furthermore, the reference in the definition that SWFs are "commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports" reflects both the traditional background to the creation of SWFs-the revenues received from mineral wealth-and the more recent approach of transferring "excess reserves." AIZENMAN AND GLICK (2008) Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are saving funds controlled by sovereign governments that hold and manage foreign assets.
SWFs are fundamentally different from monetary authorities holding official foreign reserves, where liquidity and security issues necessitate a short investment horizon and low risk tolerance. Central banks generally invest their foreign exchange reserves conservatively in safe and marketable instruments that are readily available to monetary authorities to meet balance of payments needs. In contrast, SWFs typically seek to diversify foreign exchange assets and earn a higher return by investing in a broader range of asset classes, including longer-term government bonds, agency and asset-backed securities, corporate bonds, equities, commodities, real estate, derivatives, and foreign direct investment.
SWFs typically make little use of leverage, in contrast to hedge funds and private equity funds which generally engage in highly leveraged transactions. SWFs also differ from large institutional private investors such as mutual and insurance funds, in that although they hold assets, they generally have no specific liabilities to be paid to shareholders or policyholders. SWFs similarly differ from sovereign pension funds (SPFs) in that the latter, while governmentowned, have explicit liabilities, such as worker pensions.
CARUANA AND ALLEN (2008)
SWFs are special purpose public investment funds, or arrangements. These funds are owned or controlled by the government and hold, manage, or administer assets primarily for medium-to long-term macroeconomic and financial objectives. *The funds are commonly established out of official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports. These funds employ a set of investment strategies which include investments in foreign financial assets. *SWFs are a heterogeneous group and may serve various purposes. Five types of SWFs can be distinguished based on their main objective:
(i) stabilization funds, where the primary objective is to insulate the budget and the economy against commodity (usually oil) price swings;
(ii) savings funds for future generations, which aim to convert nonrenewable assets into a more diversified portfolio of assets and mitigate the effects of Dutch disease; (iii) reserve investment corporations, whose assets are often still counted as reserve assets, and are established to increase the return on reserves; (iv) development funds, which typically help fund socio-economic projects or promote industrial policies that might raise a country's potential output growth; and (v) contingent pension reserve funds, which provide (from sources other than individual pension contributions) for contingent unspecified pension liabilities on the government's balance sheet.
These objectives may be multiple, overlapping, or changing over time. For example, in some countries (e.g., Botswana, Russia) stabilization funds have evolved into funds with a savings objective, as accumulated reserves increasingly exceeded the amounts needed for short-term fiscal stabilization. The various objectives of SWFs imply different investment horizons and risk/return trade-offs which have led to different approaches in managing these funds. SWFs with a stabilization objective would put more emphasis on liquidity and have a shorter-term investment horizon than SWFs with a saving objective, where liquidity needs are low.
BLUNDELL-WIGNALL (2008)
A SWF is a fund set up to diversify and improve the return on foreign exchange reserves or commodity (typically oil) revenue, and sometimes to shield the domestic economy from (cycle inducing) fluctuations in commodity prices. As such most invest in foreign assets. This group (in order of size) includes the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), the Norway Government current economic climate, however, this has taken a back seat to developing its home economy. Nevertheless, its international investments and willingness to invest abroad warrant RAKIA being considered as a SWF.
Our criteria enabled us to filter out several funds that are commonly included on lists of sovereign wealth funds. Dubai International Capital is a notable exclusion because it ultimately is based on the personal wealth of the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. As such, it acts more like a private equity fund. Clearly it is intimately interconnected with Dubai's economy and state investment vehicles but its managers emphatically deny that it is a SWF. We have also excluded funds used solely for currency stabilization, economic development or charitable purposes that have non-commercial objectives. By nature, these tended to violate either criteria four or five in our definition.
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK-FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW (2009)
[SWF is a] special investment fund created/owned by a government to hold assets for longterm purposes; it is typically funded from reserves or other foreign-currency sources, including commodity export revenues, and predominantly has significant ownership of foreign currency claims on non-residents.
KOTTER AND LEL (2011)
We define SWFs as government-owned investment vehicles with no explicit liabilities to their owners other than internal to the government, significant exposure to high-risk foreign assets, and a long-term investment horizon BALDING (2012) A SWF is a pool of capital derived from net wealth accumulation controlled by a government or government-related entity that invests in assets seeking returns above the risk-free rate of return.
CLARK, DIXON AND MONK (2012)
SWFs are government-owned and controlled (directly or indirectly) investment funds that have no outside beneficiaries or liabilities (beyond the government or the citizenry in abstract) and invest their assets, either in the short or long term, according to the interests and objectives of the sovereign sponsor.
1. Ownership: Governments, both central and sub-national, own and, to varying degrees, control SWFs. Control can be exerted either directly or indirectly through the appointment of the SWF board.
2. Liabilities: One point of agreement illustrated by the IWG's (2008, 15) survey of SWFs is that these SWFs "have no direct liabilities". This is perhaps a surprising point of agreement, as certain SWFs do have liabilities, such as sterilization debt or some deferred contractual liability to transfer money out of the SWF and into the general budget or a social security system (Rozanov 2008) . However, the point is that SWFs have no outside (non-governmental) liabilities. For those funds that do have a liability, it is typically intra-governmental, i.e. one arm of the government owes another arm of the government money. For example, the SWF might owe funds to the Ministry of Finance, the central bank or even the social security reserve fund. However, SWFs have no external creditor, which means the assets are not encumbered by the property rights of outside, non-governmental owners. In short, SWF liabilities (if they have any) are part of the broader national balance sheet.
3. Beneficiary: Despite certain explicit goals (e.g., filling a future PAYG pension gap), SWFs are managed according to the interests and objectives of the government or sovereign. As the accounting distinction underpinning Point 2 above suggests, the ultimate beneficiary of a SWF is not a specific individual. Rather, the beneficiary is either the government itself, the country's citizenry in the abstract, the taxpayer generally or is simply left unidentified. This objective function drives the strategic choices made by funds' asset managers, as the notion of fiduciary duty, which disciplines the investment practices of western financial institutions like pension funds, does not apply.
